How Russia Made Ukraine’s Recruitment Centres a Hated Symbol

Discrediting the State as a Tool of PsyOps

It is 2025, at a petrol station near the town of Pyriatyn, in the Poltava region. A convoy carrying newly mobilised men has stopped on the way to a training centre. At that moment, a man in a balaclava approaches the bus. He walks up to the Territorial Recruitment Centre serviceman escorting the convoy and orders him to hand over his service weapon. The serviceman refuses, and is fatally wounded.

The man in the balaclava was a resident of Pyriatyn. His motive was an attempt to “rescue” a relative who had been mobilised and was being taken to the training centre. The two of them fled the scene together, but both were later detained.

Another case occurred in Lviv that same year. A veteran who had defended Ukraine since 2014 and was at the time serving in a Territorial Recruitment Centre was fatally wounded by a man he had stopped for a document check.

These two killings are telling. But to understand how and why Ukraine has reached the point where its citizens resist, attack, wound and sometimes kill their own servicemen, one must look at the context that has been taking shape since 2022. The overall figures for such incidents have only risen since the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion.

Over the course of 2025, 341 attacks on Territorial Recruitment Centre personnel were recorded in Ukraine. Compared with 2024, when 118 cases were recorded, this is an almost threefold increase. As of December 2024, 40% of Ukrainians did not trust the Territorial Recruitment Centres. By July 2025, distrust had risen to 43%, according to a survey by the Rating Sociological Group.

That said, the problem of mobilisation and of citizens’ relations with the Recruitment Centres is not itself invented: its existence is acknowledged by parliamentarians, by the military ombudsman and by the Ministry of Defence.

In 2026, MP Fedir Venislavsky, a member of the Verkhovna Rada’s national security committee, spoke of the need to “minimise the number of conflicts between citizens and Territorial Recruitment Centre servicemen”, and stressed the need to improve the system so that mobilisation is fairer. In response to the accumulated criticism, a reform of the Recruitment Centres is also under discussion within the government. There has even been public talk of changing the Centres’ format and name.

The problems that arise during mobilisation, then, are real. Yet when analysts at the Molfar Intelligence Institute examined claims about problems with mobilisation, they found that 127 cases in their sample were outright manipulation or pure fabrication.

The Russians take society’s real pain and blend new meanings into it. This is one of the four documented mechanisms of Russian PsyOps — feeding off genuine vulnerabilities — which we described in a previous piece.

Let us trace how one of Russia’s largest information operations against Ukraine was constructed.

Manipulation by the numbers

Sociologists measure the emotional tone of public discussion on a scale from −100 to +100, where zero denotes a neutral state. In its monitoring for late December 2025 to early January 2026, the Ukrainian Centre for Security and Cooperation (UCSC) recorded an NSR of −88 on the subject of mobilisation.

* TRC — Territorial Recruitment Centre

NSR (Net Sentiment Rate) is the ratio of positive to negative mentions on a scale from −100 to +100, where 0 is a neutral tone. An NSR of −88 therefore means that, of all emotionally charged mentions of mobilisation, the overwhelming majority are negative and only a negligible share positive.

UCSC analysts wrote that “the emotional tone had reached its peak”.

Monthly breakdown of documented disinformation cases about mobilisation, May 2023 – March 2026.

A Molfar Intelligence Institute study documented 127 cases of disinformation about mobilisation over the period from May 2023 to March 2026. They show that more than half (60.6%) of the fakes and manipulations were aimed at fostering the belief that the state is a source of violence and total control. Some 77.1% of the content appealed to fear, aggression and hostility.

The largest number of posts recorded in the study fell in 2024 — 62.2% of all documented cases. But the operation is ongoing. New tools have been added: artificial intelligence, deepfake videos, bot networks running thousands of accounts. The volume of material has fallen, but the quality and depth of its impact have grown.

Only 16.5% of the cases concerned the exaggeration of the scale and methods of mobilisation. The real aim is to strike at mobilisation by destroying trust in state institutions.

In 44 posts (34.6%) linked to the demonisation of the Territorial Recruitment Centres, analysts identify recurring linguistic patterns and devices:

• “killed”, “beaten”, “run down”;

• “kicking in doors”, “hunting”, “traps”;

• “a vet decides who is fit to serve”.

A further 33 cases (26%) are fakes about restrictions and punishments, meant to instil the idea that the state controls every aspect of life:

• the blocking of bank cards;

• the denial of services (gas, water, healthcare);

• control of cash machines, shops and petrol stations;

• call-up papers appearing in Diia, on PlayStation, on shop receipts.

Manipulation patterns across the 127 documented cases of PsyOps against the Territorial Recruitment Centres

The emotional funnel, and examples of PsyOps about the Territorial Recruitment Centres

Research in neuroscience shows that fear and anger amplify one another. People who were frightened first grew angrier, and did so faster. This is confirmed by a study published in the scientific journal Neural Plasticity.

Russia’s PsyOps against the Territorial Recruitment Centres are built on a similar principle. The Molfar Intelligence Institute’s analysis of 127 documented cases shows that fear (48.8% of posts) and anger (28.3%) predominate in the coverage of the Recruitment Centres. Then come distrust — 15.7% of texts — and mockery — 7.1%.

The distribution of emotions across the disinformation cases concerning the Territorial Recruitment Centres (May 2023 – March 2026). Fear, anger, distrust and mockery form a kind of emotional funnel.

Fear

A Facebook post sharing the alleged Ternopil utility letter, with a Russian-language caption threatening to cut off residents’ hot water and gas if a conscript registered at their address fails to report for mobilisation. The Ternopil Regional Recruitment Centre denied issuing such letters.

In August 2023, information circulated on social media about letters purportedly from Ternopil’s municipal utility service. Conscripts, it was claimed, were being threatened with having their gas and hot water cut off if they failed to report to a Territorial Recruitment Centre. The Ternopil Regional Recruitment Centre denied this.

Anger

The claim that a man with a missing leg was being called up to serve in the Armed Forces of Ukraine was first spread by pro-Kremlin channels.

A close-up of the ringed section, which states that despite an above-shin amputation of the right leg the man is “fit for military service, functionally limited” — the line pro-Kremlin channels used to claim Ukraine was conscripting an amputee.

A representative of the Territorial Recruitment Centre denied this to the outlet StopFake.

Mockery

In May 2024, pro-Russian Telegram channels spread the claim that Ukraine’s Ministry of Defence had supposedly announced a tender to purchase 1,000 protective cups for the genitals of Recruitment Centre staff, who were allegedly being kicked in the groin on a regular basis while handing out call-up papers. The total value of the tender was said to be 32 million hryvnias.

A screenshot supposedly from a Euronews video.

As proof, a video segment bearing the Euronews logo was attached.

No such video exists on Euronews’s official channels, however, and no such tender appears either on the Prozorro platform or at the Ministry of Defence.

A combined case

In January 2024, a video appeared in Ukrainian Telegram channels supposedly showing Recruitment Centre staff handing out call-up papers in Warsaw. Some sources presented it as a joke, but others took it entirely seriously. Within a single day, 9 January, the video spread across the Ukrainian segment. By 10 January it had reached the Russian information space. The Russians circulated it as supposedly reliable information, citing the pro-Russian site Strana.ua. The Centre for Countering Disinformation established — citing the Ukrainian Embassy in Poland — that the video had been staged.

A second wave of the campaign, aimed at Ukrainians abroad, began in January 2025, when Ukrainians in Poland started receiving fake call-up papers, supposedly in the name of the Polish Office for Foreigners.

A fake call-up letter sent to Ukrainian men in Poland. Source: Suspilne.

The Office for Foreigners denied sending out such letters.

These are only a few examples from the documented manipulations. According to the Molfar Intelligence Institute’s study, however, the operation has evolved by degrees. At first it worked to create an emotional backdrop; now part of the content goes so far as to directly legitimise violence against Recruitment Centre servicemen.

A distinct group, 18.1% of all documented cases, consists of material that pushes towards action. Some 11% directly or indirectly legitimise violence against Recruitment Centre servicemen and law enforcement officers. A further 7.1% discredit international support for Ukraine, portraying its Western partners as accomplices in forced mobilisation.

Bot networks and the channels that amplify PsyOps

The Molfar Intelligence Institute recorded a wide range of public figures who have systematically spread manipulative content about the Recruitment Centres. Each operates differently, but they can be loosely grouped by their line of activity.

Politicians

The former MP Oleksandr Dubinsky (FB, Inst, YT, TG, source). He has now been charged with treason. Dubinsky regularly published material that reinforced anti-mobilisation narratives.

Artem Dmytruk (TG, YT, Inst, source) — an MP who is on the run. He is known for pro-Russian statements and his support for the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate.

Yevhen Shevchenko (TG, source) — formally still a sitting MP of the ninth convocation. He is currently in custody. He was officially charged with treason on 14 November 2024. That same day, the State Bureau of Investigation and the Security Service of Ukraine stated that his activities had harmed Ukraine’s defence capability and information security.

Bloggers

Artem Zavod (TikTok, Inst) publicly claimed that he had not left his home for 71 days because he was afraid of the Recruitment Centres, filming videos about it for social media. “Zvychainyy Khlopets” (“An Ordinary Guy”) (YT) posted instructional videos on how to resist Recruitment Centre servicemen. He was later convicted in Chernihiv. Anatoliy Shariy also posted anti-mobilisation videos (FB, TikTok, TikTok2, YT, TG, Inst, source).

A blogger who presents himself as a lawyer, Serhiy Kostyra (source, FB, Inst), wrote on Facebook that dating sites were “in the sights of the girls from the Recruitment Centres”.

Media and Telegram channels

Strana.ua — an outlet with documented pro-Russian ties. The publication has regularly acted either as the original source of existing fakes about the Recruitment Centres or as their amplifier.

“Budni Ukhyliranta” (“An Evader’s Daily Life”, @padla_tck) is one of the most blatant examples. The channel makes no secret of its stance, using hashtags such as #GetTheRopeAndSoapReady, #GetTheGuillotineReady, #ArmYourself, #DefendYourself.

A post from the “Budni Ukhyliranta” (“An Evader’s Daily Life”) channel gloating over a Russian Lancet strike on a Recruitment Centre bus in Odesa region (Dalnyk-Sanzheika, 27 March). A Russian attack on Ukrainian servicemen is served up as “delicious” news, with ironic hashtags and approving reactions from followers — a stark example of an enemy strike turned into cause for celebration.

One of the posts on the Telegram channel, about a Russian Lancet drone striking a Recruitment Centre bus in Odesa.

Ukraina.ru is effectively an official Russian outlet, tied to a Russian state media holding. It belongs to the Russian state media holding Rossiya Segodnya, headed by Dmitry Kiselyov.

Antikor spread material by the blogger Serhiy Kostyra — the same material in which he talks about call-up papers sent through dating sites.

Physical attacks on the Recruitment Centres as a product of PsyOps

In the summer of 2025, the Russians carried out a series of strikes on buildings housing Recruitment Centre servicemen; 11 servicemen were injured in the attack. Russia is deliberately (1, 2) striking Recruitment Centre buildings, which confirms that the ultimate aim of this PsyOps campaign is the physical destruction of the institution of mobilisation.

But missiles and drones are not the only instrument. Sometimes Ukrainian citizens themselves are used for such strikes.

In February 2025, explosions went off near three Recruitment Centres at once — in Rivne, Pavlohrad and Kamianets-Podilskyi. The bombers were Ukrainian citizens. But the investigation showed that the people had either been blackmailed or were acting on commission. The Russians spread this as “popular resistance to the Recruitment Centres”.

First the information operation persuades society that the Recruitment Centres are “punishers and enemies”. Then a recruited Ukrainian sets fire to one of their vehicles. Or tries to “rescue” a relative from mobilisation.

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Russia’s operation against the Recruitment Centres is a vivid example of PsyOps during a full-scale war. Three years of systematic work by Russian agents have turned the institution of mobilisation into the principal “enemy” in the eyes of part of Ukrainian society. The instruments of this operation are old videos, switched headlines, fake documents, emotions and bot farms. The result is a dangerous one for a country at war: the level of distrust towards its own military has reached a critical mark.