Orlando, Milan, Shanghai: where do Russians launch Shahed drones from? Molfar Intelligence Institute analyzes secret documents from Alabuga

This summer a clip surfaced online showing Russian staff demonstrating how they launched Shahed drones at Ukrainian homes and energy facilities (1, 2). The footage came from “Voennaya Priyomka,” a propaganda TV program on the Zvezda channel. We previously analyzed part of this video and identified what Russia calls a “small drone port” — make sure to read that piece too.

A screenshot from a Russian propaganda video showing “Shahed” drones being launched from the so-called “large drone port” using American Dodge vehicles

Another segment showed a “large drone port.” Ukrainian OSINT analysts from the Dnipro OSINT ⟨Harbuz⟩ community determined that the site was in the village of Tsimbulova in Russia’s Oryol region. Alabuga staff used similar code names for these sites in internal documents. Molfar Intelligence Institute has uncovered how this system works.

The magic of letters: decoding the names of secret locations

Analysts at the Molfar Intelligence Institute obtained a scanned list of Design Bureau employees whose business trips to “Navoiy,” “Kustanai,” and “Orlando” were scheduled for payment between September 9 and October 11, 2024. At first glance, this resembled Timur Konovalov’s covert trip to Astana, Kazakhstan. However, in this case, one detail stood out: the destination names were in quotation marks, which immediately raised questions. It is likely the names like “Orlando,” “Kustanai,” and “Navoiy” referred to launch sites for Russian-made Shahed drones.

In our first article on Alabuga’s inner workings, we described other code words used in official documents. For example, “pampushki” (“small buns”) referred to SIM cards used in Shahed drones, “boats” meant drones, the letter “Ы” referred to drones produced at Alabuga, and “Zone 404” was their code name for Ukraine. When it came to launch sites, however, the coding was much simpler.

What do the words “Orlando” and “Oryol region” have in common? The first letters. This is the same method Russia uses to disguise other locations from which it launches drones at Ukraine.

Once you look at names like “Kustanai,” “Navoy,” “Shanghai,” “Milan,” and “Port Arthur,” the pattern becomes clear:

• “Navoy” refers to the town of Navlya in Bryansk region;
• “Shanghai” points to the Shatalovo airfield in Smolensk region;
• “Milan” is the Millerovo airfield in Rostov region;
• “Kustanai” indicates Kursk Oblast, specifically the Khalino airport;
• “Port Arthur” refers to the Primorsko‑Akhtarsk airfield in Krasnodar Krai.

Later in this article, we’ll take a closer look at each of these sites. First, here’s a brief overview of what a typical drone launch site includes:

• a runway for launches using ground vehicles;
• separate areas for storing warheads, away from other facilities;
• spaces for assembling drones, storing finished units, and preparing them for launch, including installing warheads, checking engines, and testing avionics and navigation systems;
• warehouses for supplies and areas for pneumatic launchers.

Russians are building Shahed drone launch sites from scratch in remote areas, as well as on military airfields. These locations are chosen because they are isolated and already protected by security, air defense, and electronic warfare systems.

So far, Molfar Intelligence Institute analysts have identified 10 launch sites and one testing range, codenamed “Banya.” In this article, we take a closer look at several of them.

Orlando: “Vegetable storage” and the graveyard of Russian Shahed drones

This is the “large drone port” featured in the video by Russia’s Zvezda TV channel, located in the village of Tsimbulova, Oryol Oblast. Coordinates: 53.368930, 35.815759.

Satellite image from October 21, 2025

Satellite images show that construction began in August 2024, and by February 2025, the main structures were already finished.

A 2025 satellite image shows the main buildings almost finished. The site may have been used to store and launch Shahed drones at Ukraine.

The report by Voennaya Priyomka shows that the eastern part of the “large drone port” contains garage-type buildings used to store Shahed drones (53.366121, 35.836281).

Satellite images from September 2025 show that, besides the garages featured in the video by Zvezda, there are 93 more garage units likely used to store drones. The images also reveal 15 underground facilities, probably used either to store drones or to equip them with warheads.

A satellite image from September 2025 shows 15 underground facilities in red, with garages for Shahed drones marked in yellow

One of those 15 underground facilities appeared in the video by Voennaya Priemka: it’s located near a garage that had already been identified.

The underground facility is shown in red, and the garage for the Shahed drones is marked in yellow — all are located along the vehicle launch lane.

Satellite images from September 2025 show that the layout in the western part of the “drone port” matches the underground structures and garages used to store drones.

In the northern part of the “drone port,” there are eight stationary launchers for deploying Shahed drones powered by diesel generators from the Russian company Tss. Make sure to remember this detail — we’ll explain more about the situation with diesel fuel in upcoming articles.

The eight launchers are highlighted in red, and the site’s diesel generators are also visible.

The main launch system for the “Geran-2” drones and their variants uses a rocket-assisted launcher with two parts: a ramp (“catapult”) and a booster that gives the drone its initial acceleration. Another launch method uses an inertial system on a RAM vehicle, where the drone’s starting speed comes from the vehicle’s movement. Both methods will be shown later in the article with examples from “drone ports” and airfields.

The large “drone port” in Orlando has four controlled entrances with checkpoints, shown in blue in the photo below.

East: 53.369381, 35.836278; north: 53.374723, 35.827890; southwest: 53.367370, 35.793713; west: 53.372545, 35.794335.

The western entrance was also photographed by agents of the partisan group “ATESH.”

Image: “ATESH”

There are two other entrances (marked in red on the satellite image above) where no checkpoints have been set up: one to the north of the site, about 20 meters from the checkpoint (53.375171, 35.827269), and one to the west (53.374205, 35.801034). These entrances are likely used by construction vehicles, as indicated by the tracks on the unpaved ground. This is also confirmed by official internal documents from Alabuga. The Russians appear to use these access points for vehicles operated by employees of “TSG” and “Alabuga Development”.

The Russians haven’t left these unguarded entrances unattended by chance. We’ll cover the details in the next article.

What is “Vegetable storage”?

In Russian documents (especially in reference to “Orlando”), there’s mention of something called a “Vegetable storage” (“Овощехранилище” in Russian). These are most likely buildings on the territory of the “drone port” where the Russians store drones and their components. The ironic name was probably chosen because other items are also given code names. For example, an industrial router-modem used to transmit telemetry and video from Shahed drones (series “Ъ”) is called a “radish.” Drone cameras are nicknamed “bread.” There’s also something they refer to as “borscht.” And, of course, the previously mentioned “pampushki” (“buns”) are SIM cards, which we cover in a separate article. Finally, “pots” is the code name for Geran-2 kamikaze drones.

Example of terminology used in Inshakov I. D.’s work report

The “vegetable storages” are used to assemble, inspect, and prepare drones for flight, as well as to store them. They are typically part of a launch site and usually consist of around 15 buildings that house personnel, store equipment and supplies, and support operational activities. The site also includes so‑called “garages” for keeping inspected and fully assembled Shahed drones. In some cases, the facilities are also used to train personnel and Russian soldiers. As of October 30, 2024, “Vegetable Storages” were active at two launch sites: “Navoi” and “Orlando.” Technical documents for other launch sites—“Milan,” “Avignon,” and “Port Arthur”—also highlight the need to build similar facilities. As of October 30, 2024, “Vegetable storages” were active at two launch sites: “Navoiy” and “Orlando.” Technical documents for other launch sites (“Milan,” “Avignon,” and “Port Arthur”) also highlight the need to build similar facilities.

Layout of the “large drone port”

Starting March 1, 2025, all “Orlando” employees have been staying at the Orel Hotel (Pl. Myru 4, Orel, coordinates: 52.968300, 36.079600). Those involved in drone attacks on Ukraine eat at a nearby spot on Komsomolska Street, 231 (coordinates: 52.940535, 36.050647)53.371530, 35.794632). In late February 2025, Alabuga’s security team had arranged accommodations for its employees, who were sent to the “large drone port,” at the Orel and Rus hotels in Orel.

Alabuga also booked a luxury room at the Megapolis Hotel in Bryansk for Timur Konovalov, mentioned in our first article, suggesting this is a common practice.

The graveyard of Russian Shahed drones

Our first article on secret drone tests in Turkey and Kazakhstan mentions Ayaz Mansurov, 18, a student at Alabuga Polytech who also produces and upgrades drones. Sergey Alekseev, Deputy General Director of the Alabuga Special Economic Zone, instructed I.R. Tazutdinov, Deputy Director for Key Partner Relations, to purchase 2,000 activated, topped-up, passport-registered SIM cards — “Tele 2” and “Global SIM” (nicknamed “pampushki”, or “buns”). Alekseev explained that this many SIM cards were needed to support testing at “Orlando,” and the internal memo names Ayaz Mansurov as the person responsible.

The documents reveal that about 200 meters from the uncontrolled western entrance, there’s a “graveyard of Shaheds” — drones that have crashed, most of which still have their electronic control units intact. Molfar Intelligence Institute analysts also know how many malfunctioning Shaheds fall on “Orlando” every night.

Going over the satellite images again, we finally spot the “graveyard” (53.372541, 35.803685).

In the southern part of the drone port, there’s also a warehouse storing warheads from crashed drones. As of early March 2025, there were over 500 of them.

The coordinates of the likely warehouse location are 53.364320, 35.804158.

Earlier, we mentioned that the “large drone port” isn’t just for storing Shahed drones in garages — it’s also where some stages of weapon assembly take place. This includes attaching warheads, checking that all components are complete, and running tests. The staff assemble test drones on site, trial new modifications, and test warheads of different power levels. The port also regularly receives TBBCh‑50M thermobaric warheads for Shaheds, one of the standard warhead types for these drones.

Shahed UAVs are also equipped with cumulative high‑explosive fragmentation warheads, weighing either 50 kg or 90 kg. The Russians can fit other types of warheads as well, including much lighter ones (some weighing as little as 4 kg).

Apart from the Alabuga specialists, outsourced workers from the Oryol region are also involved. Their lack of experience often leads to mistakes when assembling the Shahed drones, which is likely why the UAVs keep failing. The bigger problem, however, is the use of low-quality parts, especially the internal combustion engines.

Even the skilled workers sometimes complain about the working conditions. Further down, the article also covers the situation at “Orlando” and incidents where employees were threatened with things like getting their knees shot.

“Kustanai”: an air-defense mound, thermobaric warheads, and hangars for Shahed drones

Khalino Airport, Kursk region. Coordinates: 51.759911, 36.287219.

Satellite image of the airport dated October 4, 2025

Between October and November 2024, the Russians began constructing reinforced concrete structures in the northwestern part of the Khalino airfield to protect military vehicles and equipment from potential attacks. The construction was completed in January 2025.

Some of the protective structures are likely being used to store Shahed drones. Analysts at Molfar Intelligence Institute identified this from a satellite image dated October 4, 2025, which shows the locations of hangars for storing drones.

Satellite images from September 1 and 17, 2025 show Shahed drones near one of the structures at 51.759075, 36.290792.

Next to this structure, there is a mound likely used to deploy Russian air defense systems, such as the Pantsir-S1 or Tor.

Internal documents from Alabuga show that this mound is intended for air defense systems. It was built by Alabuga specialists.

North of the identified location, there are five more protective structures and two building complexes, each surrounded by defensive mounds. These facilities may be used to store ammunition and Shahed drones. The roads between the buildings and structures are clearly not built for aircraft. A satellite image from September 17, 2025, shows military cargo vehicles near the protective structures, likely supporting logistics at the site (marked with a red oval in the image below).

The Russians regularly deliver thermobaric warheads (TBBCh‑50M) for Shahed drones to this site, just as they do to the ‘large drone port’ in the Oryol region. The warheads are likely mounted on the drones inside one of the protective structures described above.

“Navoiy”: Cutting trees and launching Shahed drones from vehicles

The town of Navlya, Bryansk region. Coordinates: 52.855678, 34.517882; 52.855132, 34.505611.

Satellite image from September 9, 2025

At the end of 2023, the Russians began clearing the area of trees at this location to prepare it for the facility. By August 2024, construction was well underway. The main launch site for Shahed drones deployed from vehicles was completed by October. In July 2025, they began building a platform with garage-style structures to the west of the main site, which was finished in September.

October 11, 2023 — Deforestation

August 14, 2024 — Construction

October 20, 2024 — The main location for launching drones from cars is built

July 20, 2025 — Construction of the western part of the main location is ongoing

September 9, 2025 — Construction of a site with garage facilities and stationary launchers west of the main location is complete.

What is located at the site?

A satellite image dated September 9, 2025 shows that the main site, used as a launch area for vehicle-mounted Shahed drones, contains three large underground structures (marked in red in the image below). These structures may be used to store drones or, as in the previous case, for attaching warheads to the drone airframes. The site also includes around 20 smaller underground structures (marked in yellow), which are used to store Shahed drones.

In the western part of the site, two fixed drone launchers (highlighted in red in the photo below) and 16 drone storage structures (marked in yellow) have been identified.

“Shanghai”: deployment of fixed drone launchers at the airfield

Shatalovo Airfield, Smolensk Oblast. Coordinates: 54.343392, 32.472524; 54.334886, 32.491853.

Satellite image dated October 4, 2025

The Russians began installing fixed launch systems at the airfield at the end of January 2025 and finished in March.

January 19, 2025 — Launchers are not present at the location

February 8, 2025 — Сonstruction work at the site

February 24, 2025 — Stationary launchers for Shahids installed

Four fixed launchers were installed at the airfield. The storage facilities are likely used to house Shahed drones and attach warheads to them.

October 4, 2025 — Stationary launchers for drones are located in the eastern and northern parts of the airfield.

October 4, 2025 — Storage facilities in the northern part of the airfield, where Shahids are stored and warheads are attached to them

21 September 2025 — Shahed drones next to one of the storage facilities (coordinates: 54.346971, 32.491320).

“Milan”: “Э144.302.00.00” and “ШИМА 773631.014” codes for warheads

Millerovo airfield, Rostov region. Coordinates: 48.954484, 40.273963.

Satellite image from October 18, 2025

Construction of the site began in November 2024, and by April 2025, four fixed launchers had been built.

In the western part of the airfield, they built a platform with four fixed launchers for Shahed drones, just like at the Shanghai airfield.

Russian special communications units transport items from NPO “Basalt” in Dzerzhinsk, Nizhny Novgorod region, and Nerekhta, Kostroma region, to the airfield. These include items labeled “Э144.302.00.00” and “ШИМА 773631.014,” likely coded designations for warheads. Combat components for drones, developed by NPO “Basalt” and produced at the Nerekhta Mechanical Plant in Kostroma region (coordinates: 57.458107, 40.549487) and the Sverdlov Plant in Dzerzhinsk, Nizhny Novgorod region (coordinates: 56.273271, 43.380506) may also be transported there. This information comes from internal classified documents from Alabuga.

“Port Arthur”: Satellite image showing a Shahed launch

Primorsko-Akhtarsk airfield, Krasnodar Krai. Coordinates: 46.066107, 38.220378; 46.058452, 38.220521; 46.049881, 38.240103.

Satellite image from September 27, 2025

Reinforced concrete protective structures have been built at the airfield, along with two garages for storing Shaheds and four fixed launchers for their deployment. Satellite images show that construction began in February 2025 and was completed in March.

The site includes two areas for storing drones, 24 garage units, a launch strip for mobile launchers, and, most likely, four fixed launchers.

“Banya” and defective Shahed drones

Analysts at Molfar Intelligence Institute obtained a scanned copy of an order issued by Alekseyev on July 24, 2024, marked “for official use only.” The document addresses defective drones, reporting procedures, and the strategy for resolving these issues.

The file also lists many names that Molfar Intelligence Institute analysts have seen before in connection with “Alabuga,” including the Sahara Thunder leak, which supports the document’s authenticity. Some of these specialists were sent on business trips to Iran, as shown by canceled booking documents (1, 2).

The document mentions “incidents” and “defective items.” Many Shahed drones fail testing and simply crash, which likely explains the “Shahed graveyards” at some drone sites. Leadership is also unhappy that employees record these incidents on their phones. Since Alekseyev raised this issue, it’s likely that these videos were shared outside of Alabuga. Security in the special economic zone will be discussed in a follow-up article.

The document also mentions the term “Banya,” meaning “bathhouse.” This appears to be another code name, this time for the drone launch site — specifically, the testing range in the village of Totskoye-2 in Orenburg region.

Layout concept of roads and platforms at the “Banya” site

Official internal documents show that modernization work was already underway in 2024 at the “Banya” site, around the control points.

The Russians use the “Banya” to test experimental equipment and train both staff and soldiers.

MII analysts obtained a document outlining the test flight program for the “Gerbera” UAV at the “Banya” site. According to the plan, the drone was to fly 232 km over designated points in 120 minutes, changing altitude along the way.

Who delivers the warheads to the launch sites?

The main customer of Alabuga’s products is the Russian Ministry of Defense.

For example, Alabuga sent a letter to Valery Averin, head of the Ministry of Defense’s Special Equipment Orders Department. The company proposed purchasing 1,000 “Gerbera” drones in 2024 and increasing deliveries to 10,000 per year starting in 2025. The letter included a specification sheet marked “secret.”

The contract between Alabuga and the Ministry of Defense for the supply of “Gerbera” drones was soon finalized, and by December 2024, the parties had signed additional agreements. These were signed on behalf of the ministry not by Averin, but by Deputy Minister Alexey Krivoruchko.

The main suppliers of warheads for Alabuga are two Russian companies: JSC “Federal Research and Production Center ‘Research Institute of Applied Chemistry’” and JSC “Scientific and Production Association ‘Bazalt.’”

According to a 2024 contract, the Research Institute of Applied Chemistry is supplying at least 3,000 thermobaric warheads weighing 50 kg for Shahed drones. The documents also mention the testing and subsequent supply of 30 units of 90‑kg thermobaric warheads (TBBCh‑90), as well as the development of an upgraded version, TBBCh‑90‑Ya, with increased payload.

The documents show that Alabuga had been in contact with the Research Institute of Applied Chemistry regarding the production and testing of warheads as early as spring 2023. By autumn, this cooperation had grown to the delivery of hundreds of these warheads.

Legal details of the Research Institute of Applied Chemistry

According to letters sent by Alabuga to the Research Institute of Applied Chemistry, the institute regularly supplied large batches of warheads in 2024 and 2025. Alabuga then distributed these warheads among the relevant military units deployed at launch sites.

JSC “Scientific and Production Association Bazalt.” Under a 2024 contract, Bazalt supplied at least 5,000 50‑kg high‑explosive fragmentation warheads for Shahed drones. Design documents for “Item 90‑K” were approved, and work began on “Item 90‑K,” likely referring to new 90‑kg warheads for Shahed drones.

Like the warheads from the Research Institute of Applied Chemistry, Bazalt’s products are sent directly to the military units that launch Shahed drones at Ukraine.

As the letters above show, warheads are delivered to the launch sites by the Federal State Unitary Enterprise “Main Center for Special Communications.” Alabuga signed a contract with the Center to provide special communications services for transporting hazardous cargo.

Documents show that Alabuga has been working with the Main Center for Special Communications since 2023.

The person responsible for setting up this cooperation on the part of the Main Center for Special Communications was Maksim Manchenko, the first deputy head for development (born 21.12.1980, VK, mmanchenko@gmail.com, mmanchenko@bk.ru, mmanchenko@mail.ru, m.manchenko@cccb.ru, +79255856710, passport: 4003 017179, individual insurance account number: 046-492-157 70). He even kindly provided his business card to Alabuga’s partners.

Business card of the contact person from the Main Center for Special Communications, sent to Alabuga and Maksim Manchenko

Below are several more excerpts from the emails we obtained. They list military units deployed at launch sites, as well as the details of the Research Institute of Applied Chemistry, Bazalt, and the factories that manufacture the warheads used in Shahed drones.

Vadim Ruzanov, Yevgeny Filippov, Yevgeny Sabirov, Alexander Davidov, Sergey Antipin, Rasil Gilyazov, and Yevgeny Borisov are staff of the Main Center for Special Communications responsible for receiving and transporting warheads.

Who is involved in launching Shahed drones at Ukraine?

Shahed launches from these “drone ports” are not carried out by the military alone. Alabuga staff are also directly involved, mainly from the Special Projects Service and the Design Bureau. The documents we obtained include a list of Design Bureau employees who were deployed to the “Navoiy,” “Kustanai,” and “Orlando” sites in September and October 2024.

The screenshot of the table shows the call signs of Special Projects Service employees who worked at the “Orlando” site alongside Russian Aerospace Forces personnel in May and June 2025.

Analysts at Molfar Intelligence Institute obtained many documents on Russian military personnel involved at Shahed launch sites. We’re reviewing the data and will soon share the full lists. Below is a screenshot showing a small sample.

At “Orlando,” many Special Projects Service employees are local residents, and their supervisor is a career Russian officer (more on him in the next article). Most Design Bureau staff, however, are students from Alabuga Polytech, and many are minors or just turned 18.

One of the employees mentioned in this document is junior specialist Ivan Inshakov. His report on assembling Shahed drones, setting up cameras on them, and even training Special Projects Service staff was referenced above. At the time he wrote the report, he was just 16.

Personnel operating the launch sites usually live in rented apartments, houses, or hotels nearby. All transport to the sites is carried out under strict secrecy, mostly at night.

Despite these precautions, panic is common among Design Bureau staff. For example, after the “large drone port” was hit by Ukrainian forces on December 26, 2024, they complained about the “unjustified risk” of having to work despite the Russian air defenses being unable to protect the launch sites. Alabuga employees expressed their frustration harshly toward management, noting that the fact most people survived was purely luck. After this attack, many staff said they wanted to leave not just the launch sites, but Alabuga entirely.

A more recent example comes from April 2025, when Special Projects Service employees, backed by armed soldiers and threatening to “shoot in the knees,” forced Design Bureau staff to go to work at the launch site.

Tensions between Alabuga units are high. This may explain why children are used in production, as they are easier to force into dangerous tasks. More on the use of minors at Alabuga will be covered in upcoming articles.

Molfar Intelligence Institute analysts also obtained documents listing over 200 Russian servicemen who likely trained at Alabuga’s Special Economic Zone for Military and Technical Training. The lists include names, ranks, positions, units, locations, birth dates, and phone numbers. These are personnel trained to operate Shahed drones.

Our team is analyzing this data and will soon publish a detailed new registry.

In short, Molfar Intelligence Institute has uncovered the secret and code names Russians use to hide Shahed testing and launch sites. They often encode real Russian locations as foreign-sounding names, matching the first two or three letters. Using satellite images and internal documents, MII analysts identified the sites and assessed the situation at the launch and testing locations. The internal documents from Alabuga also reveal the supply chain for delivering warheads to the drone launch points.

Although some staff at the launch sites (for example, at “Orlando”) show signs of low motivation, a shortage of experts, or reliance on untrained local workers, Alabuga’s leadership even involves minors in the work.

In the next article, we will look at security issues at Alabuga. Stay tuned.