The Four Pillars of Russian Influence in Moldova: An Overview from Molfar Intelligence Institute

Pillar #1. Media

Russian influence spreads through the media. This isn’t just about Ukraine, where Russian media has become another tool for the invaders. Wherever Russian newspapers appear, Russian TV channels are accessible, or social media pushes videos from Russian bloggers, influence seeps in — often unnoticed. It’s seems impossible to avoid it entirely. Even if newspapers are restricted and not imported, online access is harder to control, making monitoring and regulation difficult while informal channels for propaganda thrive.

Since February 2022, the Moldovan government, through the SIS (Information and Security Service), has been revoking licences from Russian media. Some outlets simply copied the blocked versions and continued operating. President Maia Sandu also signed a law banning the retransmission of Russian news and analysis programmes, as well as military films, with fines for non-compliant channels.

In October 2023, 22 Russian news websites with a .ru domain and 31 propaganda outlets were blocked. In September 2024, five more websites and a TV channel linked to occupied Crimea were also blocked. In October, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs denied accreditation to a RIA Novosti correspondent for the presidential elections. In November 2024, MIA “Rossiya Segodnya” and ANO “TV-Novosti” were blocked.

Another issue is the influence of oligarchs on the media. Many TV channels in Moldova regularly fail to meet the minimum requirements for broadcasting in Romanian, and are fined by the Radio and Television Broadcasting Commission. Media outlets are partly controlled by oligarchs and politicians, with links to both ruling and opposition parties. This often shapes editorial policies, leading to bias, propaganda, or even discrimination against political opponents.

Influence on certain media in Moldova

Ilan Shor and his circle
Media: Moldova24 TV, TV6, Orizont TV, Accent TV, Primul în Moldova, gagauznews.md, Cinema 1, 7 TV, Moldavskiye Vedomosti, KP Moldova.

Key points:

•  most are under sanctions and have lost their broadcasting licences;
• continue to operate online;
• promote pro-Russian narratives;
•  allegedly funded through shadow sources;
• involved in political campaigns;
• maintain close ties with Gagauzia and Transnistria.

Vladimir Plahotniuc
Media: One TV, Mega TV, Canal 5, Canal 2, Canal 3, Prime TV, Publika TV, ITV Moldova, today.md, livenews.md.

Key points:

• most channels are shut down or under sanctions;
•  the owner was on the international wanted list from 2019 to 2025;
•  linked to oligarchic schemes;
•  content is generally pro-Russian or against the current government.

Corneliu Furculiță (PSRM)
Media: Exclusiv TV, NTV Moldova, RTR Moldova, Argumenty i Fakty, KP Moldova.

Key points:

• generally follow a pro-Kremlin line;
• have been fined for legal breaches;
• operate a newspaper and Telegram channels.

Media outlets like actualitati.md and Noi.md are owned by members of the PSRM.

Irina Vlah (PP “Heart of Moldova”)
Media: Gagauzinfo.md, gagauzia24.info, Radio Sud, vfokuse.md, Teleradio-Găgăuzia (GRT).

Key points:

• local pro-Russian media in Gagauzia;
• spread anti-European narratives;
• conflicts with the Security Council;
• access to certain websites and radio stations is blocked.

The Russian state (via controlled structures)
Media: Sputnik Moldova, Bloknot Moldova (Note Moldova) , The “Portal of Orthodox Journalists of Moldova ‘Tradition’, ortodoxinfo.ro

Key points:

• operate through mirror websites and social networks despite sanctions;
• actively spread Russian propaganda;
• blocked in Moldova and abroad;
• retain some support among the population.

Moldovan Television.

Before 2022, the Russian language dominated, with up to 60 TV channels operating. In 2024, 41 TV channels were broadcast.

In December 2022, the Commission for Exceptional Situations (CES) in Moldova shut down six TV channels (Primul in Moldova, RTR-Moldova, NTV-Moldova, Accent TV, TV6, and Orhei TV), accusing them of disseminating false information about events in Moldova and the war in Ukraine.

In October 2023, the SIS blocked the websites (1, 2) of Russian channels (Rossiya 1, Rossiya 24, Pervy Kanal, NTV, TVC, Zvezda, Mir, Rossiya Segodnya, REN TV, Vesti, RTR-Planeta, Tsargrad, Pyaty Kanal, Spas, 360°). Although the channels were blocked, their social media accounts continue to operate, publishing content on YouTube and in text format on other social networks.

In October 2023, the Familia TV channel had its broadcasting license revoked. In August 2024, the Mega TV channel, which promoted the pro-Russian politician Ilan Shor, had its license revoked. Both TV channels belonged to Real Radio SRL, a company linked to Moldovan oligarch Vladimir Plahotniuc.

Moldovan Media.

In February 2022, Moldova’s Security and Intelligence Service shut down the local office of Sputnik for inciting hatred during Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Yet by August 2025, their website was still active. Pro-Russian channels and websites regularly use Russian and spread pro-Russian, anti-European and anti-Ukrainian narratives (e.g. Gagauzinfo.md, Stiri.md, Bloknot Moldova, Sputnik Moldova). Even when websites are blocked, their social media keep running, and “mirror” sites appear or are shifted to Russian domains under Moscow’s control.

Moldovan Newspapers.

As of July 2025, at least 115 Russian newspaper editions are still available in Moldova (1, 2), and can even be ordered through the state postal service, Poșta Moldovei. In October 2023, the SIS blocked several newspaper websites, yet the print versions continued to be published and distributed.

By law, newspapers can only be banned by a court ruling or under criteria set by the European Court of Human Rights. No licence is needed to print or distribute them. In practice, if one newspaper is shut down, it usually reappears within days under a new legal entity.

Printed newspapers from Moldovan branches of Russian outlets still circulate, e.g. the partially blocked newspaper “Komsomolskaya Pravda Moldova” (KP Moldova). In a June 2025 survey by the Independent Journalism Centre (1,045 respondents), KP Moldova ranked among the top five most recognised print titles. Others on the list were Ziarul de Gardă (an independent investigative paper), Makler (an advertising platform), Argumenty i Fakty (a Russian outlet whose main site is blocked), and Moldova Suverană (the Moldovan government’s official newspaper).

Moldovan Radio.

The government has imposed sanctions on pro-Russian newspapers, TV channels and websites, but the situation with radio is different. No pro-Russian radio stations have been banned in the country.

As of April 2025, the most popular radio stations were Radio Moldova (state radio) with a 24.6% share, HIT FM with 14.1%, Radio Plai with 12.6%, and Radio Noroc with 12%. HIT FM, which broadcast content from the banned Radio Sputnik, is licensed to Radio Top SRL, managed by Dan Lozovan and Tatiana Gumeni. The Lozovan family also owns Radio Relax and Radio Roks, and Lozovan himself is believed to be connected to media figures previously linked to oligarch Plahotniuc (1, 2, 3). By October 2024, HIT FM had become the country’s most listened-to station.

According to research by the Moldovan NGO WatchDog, in 2023 around 27.5% of Moldovans trusted Russian or Russian-language media, down from 42.9% in 2021.

Moldovan Telegram Channels.

Most of the channels share political or religious content. Out of 41 Telegram channels, many are part of two major networks, “Network 1” and “Network 2,” both linked to Russia. These networks lead in both channel numbers and audience reach.

• Network 1. A cluster of channels that regularly shared each other’s content. They were likely set up by a single pro-Russian network to stir up instability. Among them are Russian outlets such as Sputnik Moldova, KP.MD, Bloknot Moldova and Argumenty i Fakty v Moldove. The network is likely linked to the Russian state. It consists of eight channels with a combined audience of 56.7K subscribers (as of August 2025).
• Network 2 is a group of channels that share content from sources like Sputnik Moldova, KP.MD, and Bloknot Moldova, and is likely linked to Russia. Popular channels in the network include Moldavskiy Krot, Insider Moldova, Beltsy 24, Moldaviya Segodnya, and Salut Moldova. The network has 17 channels with a total of 34,660 subscribers as of August 2025.
• Ilan Shor. Some channels are associated with specific political figures, for example, “Stop EU Moldova” is affiliated with Ilan Shor, a well-known pro-Russian politician and oligarch.
• Russian Orthodox Church includes channels related to the Russian Orthodox Church (ROC), such as “Mitropolia Moldovei” and regional diocesan channels. This network has 8 channels with a total of 9,890 subscribers (August 2025).

In May 2025, around 100 people, mostly clergy, traveled to Antalya, Turkey, for training. Journalists reported that the priests were expected to manage Telegram channels and faced fines if they didn’t reach the required subscriber numbers: those with fewer than 100 subscribers would lose their funding, while those with 100-200 subscribers would receive only half.

Most channels are active. Only one, “Gagauz Republic,” is listed as blocked, yet it still operates. Audience sizes vary: the most popular have over 30,000 subscribers (for example, “Moldavskiy Krot” with 32,000), most have 2,000-10,000, while Russian Orthodox Church channels reach just a few hundred, up to a maximum of 1,000.

In October 2024, the channels of Ilan Shor, Evgenia Guțul, deputies Marina Tauber, Vasile Bolea, Alexander Nesterovschi, and Vitneanski Iurii were blocked, along with the NGO “Eurasia,” the “Pobeda” political bloc account, the Youth Victory movement, and media outlets such as Gagauzinfo.MD, Gagauzskaya Respublika, Moldova 24, Just the Facts, and NextGenerationMoldova. In total, 15 channels and 95 chatbots were blocked.

Journalists and media figures.

Some have held, or currently hold, political roles or have stood for election.

What are pro-Russian bloggers, journalists, political analysts, and politicians saying?

• Anti-Western messages: spreading conspiracy theories, criticising NATO, claiming “Romanianisation,” and attacking Maia Sandu’s government.
• Promoting pro-Russian politicians and movements: supporting the PSRM, Ilan Shor, and similar platforms.
• Twisting facts about the Ukraine conflict: justifying Russia’s actions and painting Ukraine negatively.
• Religious and cultural messaging: pushing conservative, traditional values in a Russian-Orthodox style.
• Disinformation on domestic politics and protests: questioning the government’s legitimacy and spreading conspiracies.

The highest activity is on Facebook, with a total of 453,800 followers.

• Facebook: Natalia Morari — 85k, Dmitry Buimistru — 79k, Veaceslav Valico — 67k.
• YouTube: Dmitry Buimistru — 86.6k, Natalia Morari — 66k, Serghei Banari — 48.6k.
• TikTok: Dina Karpinski — 92.9k, Natalia Morari — 40.6k, Serghei Banari — 31.9k.
• Telegram: Serghei Banari — 14.2k, Bogdan Țîrdea — 9.9k, Dmitry Buimistru — 9.5k.

Some opinion leaders keep two accounts on the same social network in case one is blocked or suspended. Some TikTok pages were also blocked, including those of Veaceslav Valico, Tudor Șoilița, and Tatiana Costachi. After the fact-checking website stopfals.md published an article exposing Tudor Șoilița’s false claims about Moldova’s role in the war in Ukraine, both of his TikTok accounts were removed.

Russia is trying to infiltrate Moldova’s information space by using every available resource, platform, and individual. The current government is working to eradicate Russian propaganda, but mirrored websites, connected TV networks, journalists with political ambitions, politicians with media influence, unregulated radio, and the ability to print and distribute newspapers without licenses all continue to support Russian influence in Moldova.

Pillar 2. Religion

Another factor behind Russian influence in Moldova is religion, particularly the Russian Orthodox Church.

The 2024 census found that 95% of Moldovans identify as Orthodox Christians. Other groups include Baptists (1.1%), Jehovah’s Witnesses (0.7%), Pentecostals (0.5%), and Adventists (0.3%).

The Chișinău and Moldova Metropolis, part of the Orthodox Church of Moldova, is active across the country, with 86% of the population as parishioners. The Bessarabian Metropolis, re-established in 1992 under the Romanian Church, has about 11% of the population.

By 2025, at least 19 parishes (some sources say 40, 60, or even 100) have voluntarily joined the Bessarabian Metropolis. Despite this, the Chișinău and Moldova Metropolis still manages the churches’ property and buildings. It can regain control through the courts or if the transfer is reversed voluntarily. The buildings themselves are owned by the state.

Structure of the Chișinău and Moldova Metropolis (ROC)

Chișinău Diocese.

Metropolitan Vladimir / Cantarean Nikolai Vasilevich.

Born in Ukraine’s Chernivtsi region, Metropolitan Vladimir holds Russian citizenship and a Russian diplomatic passport (passport 4515 297729, SNIOR 19261162263, TIN 772175011201). While serving as Metropolitan of Moldova, he was granted the military rank of colonel by the Moldovan Ministry of Defense (Order No. 098, 28 August 1998).

In May 2019, Metropolitan Vladimir was personally awarded the “Order of Friendship” by Putin for his “significant role in preserving Russian cultural and spiritual heritage in Moldova and for promoting Russian-Moldovan cooperation.”

From 2015 to 2021, following Russia’s Patriarch Kirill’s order, Vladimir was the abbot of the Church of the Presentation of the Blessed Virgin Mary in Barashi, Moscow, which hosted a representative office of the Chișinău and Moldova Metropolis. In 2021, he became the abbot of another Moscow church with a diocesan office — the Church of the Life-Giving Trinity in Konkovo.

In October 2022, he received the “Order of St. Seraphim of Sarov” (First Class) from Patriarch Kirill. In December 2024, he is believed to have travelled to Russia for a church synod meeting. He also holds two Ukrainian tax identification numbers, suggesting he is a Ukrainian citizen.

In July 2025, Metropolitan Vladimir publicly blessed the blogger Dima White, saying he follows his activity on social media. Dima White is under criminal suspicion for producing and distributing child pornography. In a comment to the media, Vladimir said he welcomes all visitors to his metropolitan residence in Chișinău and does not check their criminal records.

Cahul and Comrat Diocese.

Archbishop Anatolie / Botnar Gheorghe Fomich.

Born in Moldova, Archbishop Anatolie studied at the Odesa Theological Seminary in Ukraine. In 2018, he awarded medals to deputies of the People’s Assembly of Gagauzia, an autonomous region, marking the 20th anniversary of the diocese. The event was attended by Igor Dodon, then-president of Moldova, and Farit Mukhametshin, the Russian ambassador.

Also in 2018, Archbishop Anatolie applied for Romanian citizenship, citing his Romanian ancestry (1, 2). In 2019, Patriarch Kirill awarded him the Order of St Daniel of Moscow, III degree, at the Cathedral of Christ the Saviour in Moscow. He was promoted to archbishop two years later. In 2023, Patriarch Kirill sent him a personal greeting and the Order of St Daniel of Moscow, II degree, marking 25 years since his ordination.

In October 2024, Anatolie, together with Bishop Marchel of Bălți and Fălești and Bishop Nicolae Roșca of Ceadîr-Lunga, organised a 150-person “peace march” supporting pro-Russian candidates from Ilan Shor’s party, including Victoria Fortună, Vasile Tarlev, and Vladimir Voronin.

In May 2025, Anatolie’s assistant awarded the St George the Victorious medal to Vasile Tarlev, leader of the public movement “Friends of Russia in Moldova,” former prime minister (2001–2008), 2024 presidential candidate, and parliamentary candidate from the “For the Future of Moldova” party.

Ungheni and Nisporeni Diocese.

Archbishop Petru / Musteață Valeriu Ivanovich.

Born in Moldova, Archbishop Petru graduated from the Odesa Theological Seminary in Ukraine in 1992 and from the Kyiv Theological Academy in 1998.

According to the article, he was appointed first as archimandrite and later as bishop despite his “sins,” following the wishes of the late Patriarch Alexy II, who had been recruited by the KGB in the 1950s, in order to influence Metropolitan Vladimir.

Like Archbishop Anatolie, Petru applied to renew Romanian citizenship in 2018, claiming to be a descendant of a Romanian and therefore eligible for citizenship (1, 2).

Bălți and Fălești Diocese.

Archbishop Marchel / Marchel Mihăescu.

Born in Moldova, Archbishop Marchel received the Order of St. Innocent, II degree, from Patriarch Kirill on his 60th birthday in 2019 at the Assumption Cathedral of the Holy Trinity Sergius Lavra in Moscow. On 16 May 2021, for “diligent service to the Church,” he was promoted to archbishop during a service at the Cathedral of Christ the Saviour in Moscow by Patriarch Kirill.

In July 2024, he attended a conference in Moscow titled “In Moldova or Romania: will Moldova remain on the map in 2025?” Guests included representatives from the Transnistrian region, Socialist deputy Bogdan Țîrdea, fugitive oligarch Ilan Shor, and members of the Russian State Duma and Senate.

In September 2024, he supported the pro-Russian candidate Victoria Fortună of the “Great Moldova” party. When Marchel was barred from leaving Moldova, Fortună said she would challenge the decision and had spoken with him personally. He was fined for campaigning, along with other priests present at the event.

Reports from the Bessarabian Metropolis (1, 2) indicate that Marchel, like Metropolitan Vladimir, holds Romanian citizenship. Documents on Romanian citizenship renewals in 2018 (1, 2) show he is the son of a Romanian. Romanian Wikipedia claims he also holds Russian citizenship, though this is not independently confirmed. He is registered with the Russian service “Hemotest,” where he provided his Moldovan passport and a Moscow address: 2 Troitskiy Lane, building 6.

Edineț and Briceni Diocese.

Archbishop Nicodim / Nicodim (Vulpe) / Vulpe Ioan Vasilevich.

Born in Moldova. In 2014, an investigation by RISE Moldova found that the company transporting gasoline, Î.M. “Capadocia,” was registered at the same address as the church that Nicodim managed until 2010. In the same city, he owned property both personally and through donations or lifetime agreements with relatives and parishioners.

By 2014, Nicodim owned a two-storey apartment building with an attic of 270 sq. m. in central Orhei, near the Cathedral of St. Nicholas. He also had three agricultural plots in Chiperceni commune, Orhei, and an apartment in Chișinău, purchased at the end of 2013.

The diocese’s legal entity holds 25% of Salubrusana SRL, with the diocese’s secretary acting as the company administrator. The remaining 75% belongs to pro-Russian businessman Victor Copiimulț, suspected in 1999 of murdering former prosecutor and Oferta Plus SRL director, Vasile Lapteacru. As of 2014, Salubrusana owned 34 tourist buildings and a 5.5-hectare plot in the Dingeni forest, Ocnita district, bought in 2009.

Nicodim, applied to renew his Romanian citizenship in 2018, citing his Romanian roots. (1, 2).

In May 2021, for “diligent service to the Church,” in the Cathedral of Christ the Savior in Moscow, Patriarch Kirill promoted Nicodim to archbishop.

According to the article, Nicodim repeatedly nominated Mikhail Aizin (1955–2020), known in the media as the criminal figure “The Chinese” and owner of the Fidesco supermarket chain, for an award for his ongoing support of the church.

In January 2025, Nicodim’s assistant welcomed Vasile Tarlev, head of the public movement “Friends of Russia in Moldova.” A few days later, Terlev received the Order of St Basil the Great for his support of the church.

Soroca and Drochia Diocese

Archbishop Ioan / Ioan (Ion) Victorovici Moșneguțu.

Born in Moldova, Archbishop Ioan completed a two-year advanced course at the All-Church Postgraduate and Doctoral School in Moscow in June 2011. In March 2015, he was ordained as an archimandrite at the Church of the Resurrection of the Word, Pokrovsky Stavropegic Convent, Moscow. In February 2017, the Holy Synod appointed him to the newly formed Organising Committee for events marking the 100th anniversary of the start of persecution against the ROC.

In August 2024, he visited Moscow on a “pilgrimage” funded by Ilan Shor to persuade parishioners against joining the EU. Shor told the media that he had not intended to go, would not have gone otherwise, and denied that he financed the trip.

In 2018, he also applied to renew his Romanian citizenship, stating that he is a descendant of a Romanian (1, 2).

Tiraspol and Dubăsari Diocese.

Archbishop Savva / Volkov Sergei Alexandrovich.

Born in Moldova, Archbishop Savva holds a Russian TIN (772001034419) and passport (4502460701). According to Flux, he is a colonel in the Russian intelligence services. In 2017, Moldova’s president at the time, Dodon, granted him Moldovan citizenship.

Shor, priests, Russia, and elections.

In April 2025, Metropolitan Vladimir said he personally asked Patriarch Kirill to fund a trip for 1,116 priests and parishioners from the metropolis to Moscow. The funding, however, was later managed by the “Eurasia” organisation, controlled by Ilan Shor, leader of the political bloc “Pobeda” and the “Șor” party, which had been sanctioned by OFAC for interfering in US and UK elections to benefit Russia and was dissolved in 2023.

In the same interview, Metropolitan Vladimir said that “Eurasia” regularly sponsors the metropolis, and pilgrims frequently travel to Russia or other countries with Russian representatives.

In March 2025, the head of Moldova’s General Police Inspectorate stated that fugitive politician Ilan Shor planned to use priests in the 2025 parliamentary elections, as he had in 2024, persuading parishioners to vote for preferred politicians. Priests who agreed to campaign reportedly received an extra $1,000 per month. Law enforcement identified at least 20 such priests.

Between March and April 2025, 16 to 19 archpriests from central districts and the dioceses of Soroca, Drochia, Ungheni, and Nisporeni went on a paid trip to Jerusalem, costing up to $40,000. During the trip, they stayed in a Russian hotel and met with representatives of the Russian Orthodox Church, a deputy from “United Russia,” and Alexander Ralnikov, head of the Russian State Duma apparatus in Astrakhan. The deputy and Russian representatives suggested creating three-person initiative groups to campaign on behalf of bishops, with young activists organised in major cities. Some of these young people were planned to be sent to Turkey for a “pilgrimage.”

Training of priest-bloggers in Turkey and the “Matushka” operation.

In May 2025, around 100 people travelled to Antalya for training. The group included priests and activists from low-income families, mainly from Gagauzia, Soroca, and Bălți, as well as members of the youth wing of the political bloc “Pobeda,” called “Next Generation.” The trip was funded by the Shor-linked organisation “Eurasia,” and organised by Russian political strategist Roman Zaglyadov.

The training was overseen by Archbishop Marchel (head of the Bălți and Fălești diocese), Bishop Nicolae Roșca (vicar of the Cahul and Comrat diocese), and Nicolae Craveț, secretary of the Soroca and Drochia diocese. Sessions included ideological instruction presenting Moldovan history and religion from a Russian perspective. Participants were also briefed on the “Matushka” operation, which involved identifying 10 women from low-income families in each village, supporting them with food, medicine, and home repairs, and influencing them against European values.

Russia is using religion to strengthen its influence over Moldova’s population. Religious leaders are drawn in, bringing their audiences with them. At the same time, the church itself is used as a political tool, with ties to the Russian Federation.

Pillar 3. Sports and Security

The next pillar of Russian influence in Moldova is the security sector and sports organisations.

Lessons from “Wagner” PMC on destabilising the country.

In February 2023, US intelligence reported a plan to hold a “protest training” in Turkey for over 150 participants. The “Wagner” private military company was involved. The training covered “organising protests, handling security responses to riots, providing first aid, and psychological preparation for detention.” It was originally scheduled for 24-28 February but was moved to Russia due to “the attention of Turkish intelligence to Russian men.”

In March 2023, Moldovan police said a “Wagner” member was arrested and charged, along with others, including Russians, with attempting to incite riots. The group was allegedly promised $10,000 for organising mass riots to destabilise the country during a protest in Chişinău. Evidence linking one suspect to “Wagner” included photographs of tattoos associated with the PMC.

Leaked US intelligence data revealed that a member of a Wagner-linked group called “The Farm” contacted the head of Russian PMC “Vegacy Strategic Services” in February 2023 to discuss plans for destabilising Moldova. According to the Conflict Intelligence Team, “Vega Strategic Services” was founded in Mykolaiv, Ukraine, by former members of elite Russian and Ukrainian units. In 2012, the company was registered in Cyprus as Vegacy Strategic Services Ltd (liquidated in 2018). The founders were Anatoly Anatolyevich Smolin (Russian TIN: 773432805690) and Yana Smolina, who reportedly moved to Russia in 2012, according to babel.ua.

Through the Moscow branch, under the leadership of Ukrainian citizen Dmytro Dzhynikashvili (born 17 July 1987), Russian intelligence recruited mercenaries for the war in Ukraine. Smolin has also recruited mercenaries for “Wagner” PMC since 2016.

LLC Vega Strategic Services was registered in Moscow in 2014, with Smolin becoming one of the owners in 2020. Since 2024, both Smolin and LLC Vega Strategic Services have been under sanctions (1, 2).

“Tactics” training ahead of Moldova’s elections and the unmasking of 11 trainers.

In October 2024, just three days before the presidential election, Moldovan law enforcement announced they had uncovered and stopped an attempt to destabilise the country. Dozens of searches were carried out, and over a hundred specially trained individuals were identified as part of the plot.

On 17 October 2024, Moldova’s Intelligence and Security Service (SIS) reported that oligarch Ilan Shor was funding trips for Moldovan citizens to Moscow for protest training through the sanctioned organisation “Eurasia,” mentioned earlier.

Some participants were sent for advanced training in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Serbia, where they learned crowd psychology, weapons handling, explosives manufacturing, and drone operation. The trainers were linked to “Wagner” PMC and related private military structures. After completing the training, these “graduates” were expected to become specialists in organising demonstrations and turning protests into mass riots, provoking clashes with law enforcement.

Serbia’s Security and Information Agency (BIA) exposed a training camp near the village of Radenka, seizing drones, Starlink equipment, radios, and explosives. Bosnian security services arrested a Russian citizen, Alexander Bezrukovny, suspected of organising the training centres.

Additionally, Moldovan citizen Maxim Roșca, who trained in the Balkans, identified his recruiter to law enforcement as Anatoliy Prizenko, a Moldovan businessman previously involved in a Russian operation in France that involved painting Stars of David on buildings in Paris. On 12 February 2025, Prizenko was detained in Chișinău on charges of complicity in preparing mass riots.

Moldovan services also identified 11 foreign instructors from Russia and Bulgaria at the training camps in Bosnia and Serbia. The list includes only first and last names, but some correspond to individuals recorded in Russian PMC databases and among Ukrainian collaborators.

Garuda Sports Club and the criminal figure “Bulgar.”

In July 2025, the Garuda Club (Clubul Sportiv “Garuda”/FightClub Garuda — Facebook, Instagram) organized the European Kickboxing Championship with support from Chișinău City Hall.

The event partnered with the WKF, an organisation not recognised by the International Olympic Committee, with offices in Russia and links to sanctioned Russian companies. Around 200 Russian and Belarusian athletes were expected to compete under their national flags and anthems in Moldova, but the championship was eventually cancelled.

An investigation in August 2025 revealed that the club received 1 million lei ($60k) from Chișinău City Hall, while another 2.7 million lei ($160k) was allocated to other sports clubs. The investigation also linked Garuda Club to rallies organised by the Patriotic Bloc (PSRM, PCRM, PRIM, and PVM).

The club’s director, Rustam Alimov, attended these rallies alongside coaches and athletes. The club’s social media accounts do not support the current government led by Maia Sandu. Alimov was awarded a “medal for services” by former president Dodon.

One of the championship organisers, Grigore Carmalac, is a criminal figure known as “Bulgar.” He travelled to occupied Crimea several times to organise an international martial arts tournament and supply gas to Sevastopol, according to investigative project RISE Moldova. Carmalac holds Russian citizenship and is sanctioned by the EU for his role in destabilising Moldova and other countries.

He is linked to Alexander Bryksin, a sanctioned Russian senator from the Kursk region. Carmalac also controls the IFAVIS Foundation (Facebook, VK), an international fund supporting veterans and disabled athletes, headquartered in Odintsovo, Moscow region. According to the EU, through IFAVIS, Carmalac organised patriotic and sports events in the occupied territories in the East of Ukraine with the support of Russian occupation authorities.

FEA Fighting Association and Russia’s “shadow fleet.”

Damir Dorin (Facebook, Instagram, Twitter, TikTok) is the founder and President of the Moldovan Fighting Association FEA, which organises fights across various disciplines, as well as the Moldovan Amateur K-1 Federation. FEA brings together several associations with a total of around 10,000 members.

At the same time, Dorin is reported to involve the company’s staff in Russia’s so-called “shadow fleet.” An investigation in July 2024 revealed that Dorin owns several companies, including FLC Shipmanagement SRL and BPC Shipmanagement SRL, which manage a fleet of tankers transporting Russian oil to India. These companies were registered under the name of Natalia Raileanu, an FEA employee.

Dorin also has links to the oligarch Vladimir Plahotniuc through the security firm Argus-S SRL, which remains active as of September 2025, although its website has been offline since 2019. Plahotniuc owns Argus-S SRL via the affiliated entity Otiv Prime Services B.V.

In 2025, Dorin began criticising the current government, claiming it is destroying everything built during the Soviet era.

Russian patriotic club that searches for the remains of Soviet soldiers and is funded by Russia.

The Russian Historical and Patriotic Club (Facebook) was founded in 2009 to “educate the younger generation in the spirit of Russian patriotism,” according to its website. Since 2020, the group has worked with the search squad “Avgust” to locate and rebury the remains of Soviet soldiers who died in World War II. Members have been awarded by former Moldovan president Igor Dodon.

The association also runs historical and military exhibitions, round tables, and conferences, and, together with the Mountain Tourism Club “Travers” and the “Avgust” squad, participates in military-patriotic tourism.

Alexei Petrovich (VK, VK2 (deleted), Facebook, Instagram, MyMail.ru, Telegram: soldat_pobedi, YouTube, Russian passport 516690089) is head of the Russian Historical and Patriotic Club and of the unregistered National Committee “Pobeda.” He represents the Russian Military Historical Society in Moldova and is a member of the Coordination Council of Russian Compatriots in the country.

In 2018, Petrovich obtained a Russian passport at the Russian embassy in Moldova. From 2020 to 2022, Petrovich worked as a research fellow at the Military Academy of the Armed Forces “Alexandru cel Bun,” at the Centre for Military Culture and History, and at the Agency for Military Science and Memory.

In 2021, he travelled to Moscow several times (1, 2). He previously spent three months as head of a department at Flacăra Albastră SRL, part of the Moldovan-Russian enterprise “Moldovagaz,” and also received a salary from the Moldovan branch of the Russian media group Rossiya Segodnya, which owns Sputnik Moldova.

According to rise.md, in 2022 Petrovich received $7,500 from the Russian-linked organisation Pravfond to organise the exhibition “Immortal Stalingrad.” In March 2024, after Pravfond was sanctioned, he requested $7,400 for a new event and was granted $8,900.

This is one of those cases where “sports” is a cover for Russia’s “shadow fleet,” and “security companies” are really private military firms like “Wagner” PMC. They don’t provide security — they spread hatred, manipulate people, and provoke actions that can destabilise the country.

Pillar 4. Political

Politicians are perhaps the biggest channel through which Russia influences politics in Moldova. As the article shows, they use the media, the church, or even sports to attract and manipulate public opinion.

Pro-Russian political forces

Analysts at the Molfar Intelligence Institute reviewed public opinion polls from the past six months to assess the position of specific political forces. Based on the latest results, a list was compiled of parties that are openly pro-Russian, as well as those whose leaders maintain close ties with Russia or pro-Russian actors.

As of August 2025, the most popular pro-Russian political force in Moldova is the Patriotic Bloc of Socialists, Communists, Heart, and Future of Moldova. This bloc was formed by four pro-Russian parties:

• The Party of Socialists of the Republic of Moldova (PSRM), led by former Moldovan President Igor Dodon.
• The Party of Communists of the Republic of Moldova (PCRM), led by former Moldovan President Vladimir Voronin.
• The Republican Party “Heart of Moldova” (PRIM), led by former PCRM deputy and Governor of Gagauzia, Irina Vlah.
• The Political Party “For the Future of Moldova” (PVM), led by former Prime Minister of Moldova during the communist rule, Vasile Tarlev.

The second-largest pro-Russian force is the Alternative Political Bloc, formed in early 2025 by three formally pro-European or neutral parties:

• The National Alternative Movement (led by the Mayor of Chișinău, former PCRM and PSRM deputy Ion Ceban).
• The Party of Development and Consolidation of Moldova (PDCM), led by former government official and Prime Minister during Dodon’s presidency, Ion Chicu.
• The Civil Action Party – Civic Congress (PAC-CC), led by former five-term communist party deputy and party ideologue Mark Tkaciuk.

Alexandru Stoianoglo also participated in creating the bloc.

A third, conditionally pro-Russian party is the “Our Party” Political Party / Partidul politic “Partidul Nostru”, led by Renato Usatii. The party officially declares neutrality but frequently criticises the pro-European policies of PAS. Usatii, who lived and ran a business in Russia, continues to receive support from Moscow, including during his political activities in Moldova.

After criminal cases were opened against him in Moldova, he stayed in Russia. In 2025, a case was also launched against him there, though this may be politically motivated. According to his last available declaration, he still owns at least 17 properties and has nine bank accounts in Russia. Despite claiming to renounce Russian citizenship, as of July 2025, Usatii remains a Russian citizen.

As of 2025, a criminal case has been opened against Usatii in Russia, though it may be a political maneuver. According to his latest declaration, he still owns at least 17 properties and holds nine accounts in Russian banks. Despite claiming to have renounced his Russian citizenship, he remains a Russian citizen as of July 2025.

Two other political forces with strong poll ratings were also analysed. One is Ilan Shor’s “Victory” Political Bloc (Blocul Politic” Victorie”), previously mentioned in relation to Russian influence in Moldova’s media and religious spheres. The other is the “Great Moldova” Political Party (Partidul Politic “Moldova Mare”), led by Victoria Furtună, who was backed by Shor’s network during the 2024 presidential election.

Moldovan politicians and their links to Russia.

Ilan Shor: money laundering, working with the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB), organising anti-government protests, fleeing Moldova, holding Russian citizenship, and bribing voters.

Shor Ilan Mironovich.
Born: 6 March 1987
Website
Leader of the “Victory” bloc, former Member of Parliament of Moldova.

Born in Israel to a family that had emigrated from Moldova, he inherited his father’s business — a chain of duty-free shops called Dufremol — at the age of 18. He later became chairman of Banca de Economii S.A., Moldova’s largest bank and the successor to the USSR’s Savings Bank. This bank, along with two others and several of Shor’s companies, was later involved in a scheme that withdrew around $1 billion from the Moldovan banking system.

He was arrested in June 2016, with his sentence later reduced to house arrest. In 2017, Shor was sentenced again to 7,5 years in prison, but he appealed. That same year, his companies were linked to another money-laundering operation, the “Russian Laundromat,” through which an estimated $20-80 billion was siphoned from Russia between 2010 and 2014, benefiting major Russian businesses and, likely, the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB).

In June 2019 Shor left Moldova and settled in Israel; he is now internationally wanted. Earlier, in February 2019, he had been elected to Parliament for the Şor Party.

A Washington Post investigation, based on material from Ukrainian intelligence, found that Shor began cooperating with the FSB in 2020. Despite this, he was re‑elected in 2021 and led his party’s parliamentary group while abroad. In April 2023 the Court of Appeal upheld the 2017 verdict against him but changed the sentence to 15 years’ imprisonment with confiscation of assets; the court also ordered him to repay about $288 million. The Supreme Court of Moldova confirmed that decision in December 2024.

The US, Canada, Switzerland, the EU and the UK have all imposed sanctions on Shor over his role in organising anti‑government protests funded by Russia.

A British NGO, Reset, found that Shor’s networks spent at least $200,000 on protest ads on Meta platforms in 2023. Leaked Pentagon documents from February 2023 say Russia continued training participants for Moldovan protests, preparing some for violent action. Those activities involved the Russian private military company Vegacy Strategic Services and an influence group linked to the Wagner network, presumably the so-called as a “troll factory”.

In late 2023 Shor moved to Russia and was granted Russian citizenship in 2024.

In October 2024 Moldovan authorities uncovered a large scheme to bribe voters ahead of the presidential election and an EU‑membership referendum scheduled for the same month. They say Russia allocated $15 million for the operation, with Shor accused of laundering the funds and organising a network intended to bribe about 130,000 voters.

In July 2025 Ukraine imposed sanctions on Shor. Sanctions were also imposed on his wife, Russian singer Sara Lvovna Shor (Manakhimova), known as “Jasmine”, by Ukraine, Canada and the US (1, 2, 3, 4).

In August 2025, Shor said that he was ready to achieve a change of power in Moldova by any means, including force.

Igor Dodon: views Crimea as Russian, wants Russian gas supplies restored to Moldova, and has an account under the name “Kremlinovich.”

Dodon Igor Nikolaevich.
Born: 18 February 1975
Website, Facebook, Facebook2, Instagram, Twitter, YouTube, VK, OK, Telegram, igordodon@gmail.com, dodonigor@gmail.com, dodonigor@yahoo.com, igor@dodon.md
Head of the PSRM party. President of Moldova (2016-2020).

During the election campaign in October 2016, Dodon said: “Crimea belongs to the Russian Federation.”

A joint investigation by Moldova’s RISE Project and the Russian opposition group Center “Dossier” found that Dodon had cooperated with Russian intelligence throughout his political career. He had a contact in the Russian Presidential Administration who pre-approved his public speeches, visited Moscow regularly, and communicated with Russian officials using an account named “Kremlinovich.”

In December 2019, he described Putin as “an example of serving his state and his people,” claiming he had “restored Russia as a great power.” By 2021, Dodon had become head of a new NGO, the “Moldovan-Russian Business Union,” which was funded by Russian sources.

In June 2024, he refused to acknowledge Russia’s responsibility for the invasion of Ukraine, echoing Russian propaganda. In July 2025, as leader of the PSRM, he visited Moscow, meeting Russian Deputy Prime Ministers Alexander Novak and Dmitry Patrushev, and Minister of Transport Andrei Nikitin, discussing the return of Russian gas to Moldova (1, 2, 3, 4).  He continues to support restoring Moldova’s cooperation with Russia.

Insiders report that Dodon may be registered in the Russian state medical system, EMIAS, though the last update was in October 2022. Another source claims that by February 2023, he held a deposit of around 745,000 rubles in Russia’s Sberbank.

Irina Vlah: anniversary medal from the Russian Orthodox Church, visits to Moscow, and Putin’s support.

Vlah Irina Fedorovna.
Born: 26 February 1974
Website, Facebook, Twitter, Instagram, TikTok.
Leader of the PRIM party. From 2005 to 2015, she served as a Member of Parliament in Moldova for the PCRM and was part of the parliamentary friendship group with Russia.

In December 2013, Vlah led the Gagauzia branch of the international public movement “Heirs of Victory,” which organised “patriotic events highlighting the Gagauz people’s connection to the Russian world.” In 2014, she actively supported a referendum in Gagauzia on joining the Customs Union.

In March 2015, backed by the PSRM, she was elected Bashkan (governor of Gagauzia, with elements of ministerial-level status in the Moldovan government) in the first round, receiving 32,500 votes (51.11%). According to an investigation by the RISE Project and the Centre “Dossier,” her candidacy was supported by the Russian Presidential Administration’s Department for Interregional and Cultural Relations, which prepared a biographical briefing for her, offered campaign guidance, and even edited her public speeches. The following month, Vlah became a member of the Moldovan Government. In 2017, she joined Dodon’s delegation on a visit to Moscow.

In 2024, Vlah ran in the presidential election, finishing fourth with 83,200 votes (5.38%). In the second round, she urged her supporters to vote against Maia Sandu and her policies.

In July 2025, as leader of PRIM, Vlah visited Moscow, meeting Russian Deputy Prime Ministers Alexander Novak and Dmitry Patrushev, and Minister of Transport Andrei Nikitin (1, 2, 3).

In early August 2025, she criticised the Moldovan authorities for “leaving farmers without work,” citing the loss of the Russian market and increased imports from Ukraine. She called for the restoration of relations with Russia, including direct flights, and accused “Western advisers” of worsening Moldova’s relations with Moscow.

On her personal website, Vlah is described as having a reputation in Gagauzia as a “pro-Russian politician.” The site also notes that during her tenure as Bashkan, she actively supported local Orthodox churches, providing donations, church items, and vestments for clergy. In 2018, she received an anniversary medal from Patriarch Kirill of the Russian Orthodox Church.

Vasile Tarlev: received Putin’s “Order of Friendship,” views Russia as a strategic partner, and spreads fakes about Moldovan soldiers killed in Ukraine.

Tarlev Vasile Pavlovich.
Born: 9 October 1963
Website, Facebook, Facebook2, Twitter, Instagram, TikTok, MoyMir, vasiletarlev@mail.ru, +79262784293.
Head of the PVM party. Of Bulgarian descent but identifies as Moldovan, as do his relatives. Former Prime Minister of Moldova.

In 2007, Tarlev was awarded the Order of Ștefan cel Mare și Sfânt by the Moldovan Metropolis of the Russian Orthodox Church “for his role in building and repairing churches and monasteries.”

In October 2014, Tarlev was elected head of the International Congress of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs, which was created in Moscow; he remains in this position as of July 2025. In August 2016, “for a great contribution to the development of business, economic, and humanitarian cooperation with Russia,” he received the award from Putin— the “Order of Friendship of Peoples.”

In April 2024, Tarlev took part in the launch of the Russian Autonomous Non-profit Organization “Eurasia,” controlled by Ilan Shor, in Moscow. In August 2024, he attempted to run for President as an independent candidate, but the Central Election Comission rejected his registration, as Moldovan law prohibits party leaders from standing independently. Irregularities were also reported in the collection of signatures for his nomination. Later that month, he was nominated by the party “For the Future of Moldova.” Romanian journalists reported that, during the campaign, students linked to Shor were paid to attend Tarlev’s events.

In April 2025, Tarlev described Russia as a “strategic partner” with which Moldova shares centuries of social, economic, cultural, and humanitarian ties. In June 2025, he attended the St. Petersburg International Economic Forum and subsequently called for restoring relations with Russia. In July, he circulated Russian disinformation about Moldovan soldiers killed in Ukraine, claiming they had been sent there under an agreement between Sandu and Zelensky.

As leader of the PVM, Tarlev, together with Dodon and Vlah, visited Moscow and met Russian Deputy Prime Ministers Alexander Novak and Dmitry Patrushev, as well as Transport Minister Andrei Nikitin (1, 2, 3). In August 2025, he criticised anti-Russian sanctions and promised to negotiate “attractive” energy deals with Russia if elected.

In July 2025, the Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs banned Tarlev from entering Romania, citing national security concerns.

Victoria Furtună: a prosecutor who likes expensive gifts.

Victoria Furtună.
Born: 24 February 1981
Website, Facebook, Instagram, Telegram
Leader of the “Great Moldova” party.

Former prosecutor, worked in the authorities since 2006. In 2016, she was appointed to the Anti-Corruption Prosecutor’s Office.

Since 2014, Furtună received gifts worth more than her official salary (1, 2) and declared buying a car at a reduced price, which was flagged by Transparency International. She also faced disciplinary proceedings.

In 2024, she ran for the presidency of Moldova.

Alexandru Stoianoglo: deputy, linked to the “Russian Laundromat,” winemaker and a supporter of communism.

Stoianoglo Alexandr Dmitrovich.
Born: 3 June 1967
LinkedIn, Facebook, Facebook2, Facebook3, Instagram, YouTube, TikTok, OK, MoyMir
Former prosecutor, candidate in the 2024 presidential election.

From May 2001 to March 2007, Stoianoglo served as Deputy Prosecutor General of Moldova. In 2006, he ran for the post of Bashkan of Gagauzia but came fourth. His campaign promised “to restore the Soviet-era healthcare system, preserve the Russian language in Gagauzia, and build social, cultural and economic ties with Russia, Ukraine and Belarus.

After leaving the prosecutor’s office in October 2007, he became an “authorised representative” of the Gagauz company Burlacu-Vin (1, 2, 3, 4). On LinkedIn he also listed himself as a co-owner. The company produced wine and brandy and aimed to enter the Turkish market, according to the mentioned announcement. Later, the business was run by his cousin, Serghei Stoianoglo (1, 2). This winery connection would later resurface in his career.

During his second term as an MP, Stoianoglo chaired the Commission on National Security, Defence and Public Order. In July 2012, he refused to back a bill condemning the totalitarian communist regime, saying he “disagreed with condemning communism.” From 2011 to 2014, he also led the friendship group between the Moldovan Parliament and Russia’s State Duma.

It is believed that while serving as MP and commission head, he continued to oversee Burlacu-Vin, which may have breached Article 70 of the Moldovan Constitution prohibiting MPs from holding other paid roles, except in teaching or research.

In March 2015, Stoianoglo again ran for Bashkan of Gagauzia as an independent candidate. His programme focused on “building economic and cultural cooperation with the strategic partners – Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan and Turkey,” notably leaving out Ukraine.

In November 2019, President Igor Dodon appointed him Prosecutor General. In May 2020, he declared that the case against businessman Veaceslav Platon, accused of funnelling around $1 billion out of Moldova’s banks, was fabricated.

Platon, who also held Russian citizenship, had been detained in Kyiv in 2016 and sentenced in 2017 to 18 years in prison in Moldova, partly over his role in the “Russian Laundromat” scheme. At Stoianoglo’s request, his sentence was suspended and he was released in June 2020. Platon is married to journalist Natalia Morari, with whom he has a child.

Under Stoianoglo’s leadership, the prosecutor’s office also closed cases against several members of Ilan Shor’s circle. The prosecutor in charge of those cases was Victoria Furtună.

In July 2024, Stoianoglo ran for president as the Socialist Party’s candidate. He declared his support for Moldova’s constitutional neutrality, calling it “responsible constitutional neutrality,” and named Russia as one of the country’s development partners. He criticised Sandu’s stance that Russia posed the main threat to Moldova, calling it “stupid and irresponsible,” and opposed Moldova’s participation in sanctions against Russia.

He came second in the first round with 401,200 votes (25.95%). Before the run-off, he received support from other pro-Russian politicians and parties including the Communists, Tarlev, Vlah and Furtună (1, 2, 3, 4). In the second round, however, he lost to Sandu with 750,400 votes (44.65%).

In October 2024, journalists revealed that Stoianoglo had also held Romanian citizenship since May 2018, a fact confirmed by Romanian authorities. They also found that he had lived in the same building as Ilan Shor for two decades.

According to insider sources, Stoianoglo’s details appear in the Russian citizens’ personal data register for 2021–2022.

Ion Ceban: studied in Moscow, signs deals with Russian investment funds, and calls the behaviour of Ukrainian refugees “ugly.”

Ceban Ion Vasilevich.
Born: 30 June 1980
Website, LinkedIn, Facebook, Facebook2, Twitter, Instagram, Instagram2, YouTube, TikTok, VK.
Mayor of Chișinău, former Member of Parliament of Moldova.

In January 2014, Ceban joined a rally in support of the planned referendum in Gagauzia on Moldova joining the Customs Union. In his speech, he backed the referendum and supported Moldova’s membership in the Union. That June, while Moldova signed the Association Agreement with the EU, Ceban took part in a PSRM protest outside the European Commission in Brussels. He argued the agreement would “kill many sectors of the Moldovan economy, especially agriculture” and again pushed for joining the Customs Union.

In January 2015, as part of a PSRM delegation, he visited Moscow and met Sergey Naryshkin, then head of the Russian State Duma. In May the same year, he opposed the ban on broadcasting the Russian TV channel Rossiya 24 in Moldova, calling the move totalitarian and anti-democratic.

In 2015, Ceban began studying public administration at the Russian Presidential Academy (RANEPA). He completed his master’s degree in 2018 and went on to a doctorate, which he received in 2019 (1, 2).

That same year, Ceban entered parliament with PSRM, placed third on the party list. In June 2019, he was elected Deputy Speaker. The following month, he visited Moscow and met Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev, Federation Council head Valentina Matviyenko and State Duma head Vyacheslav Volodin.

An investigation by RISE Moldova and the Dossier Centre found that Russian political strategists worked in his election headquarters. Their involvement in foreign elections was described as a decision taken by the Russian Presidential Administration.

After becoming mayor, Ceban met Russian ambassador Oleg Vasnetsov and said Chișinău “very much counts on the support and experience of the big cities of Russia.” Two weeks later, he made his first official trip abroad — to Moscow — where he met Mayor Sergey Sobyanin and Deputy Prime Minister Dmitry Kozak, then responsible for Moldova-Russia trade and economic ties. Kozak later became Deputy Head of the Russian Presidential Administration.

In April 2020, Ceban signed a cooperation deal with RK-Investitsii, a subsidiary of the Roscongress Foundation, set up by Putin to promote Russia’s economic and political interests.

According to an investigation by Eesti Päevaleht and the Dossier Centre (1, 2), Ceban stayed in Moscow until 25 February 2022 — the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine.

In March 2022, he complained that some Ukrainian refugees in Moldova were behaving “ugly” and “inappropriately.” Only in October 2022 did he, for the first time, call Russia the aggressor and condemn the invasion, having previously refused to comment.

In July 2025, Romania’s Foreign Ministry banned Ceban from entering the country on national security grounds. The ban also applies across the Schengen Area.

Ion Chicu: Russian gas discounts, Moscow’s soft power tool, and Moldova’s military neutrality.

Chicu Ion Vasilevich.
Born: 28 February 1972
Facebook, Twitter, Instagram, Threads, Telegram
Former Prime Minister of Moldova and adviser to Dodon.

From 2007 to 2009, he was deputy chairman of the board at Moldovagaz, a Moldovan-Russian joint stock company responsible for supplying, transporting and distributing natural gas. Until 2022, Moldovagaz held a monopoly on Russian gas supplies to Moldova, with Gazprom owning 50.01%+1 share and a further 13.44% controlled by the Russian occupation authorities in the Transnistrian region.

From September 2009 to December 2017, Chicu worked as a public finance management consultant for Moldova’s Ministry of Finance through projects run by ECORYS, a consulting company specialising in economic research. ECORYS also had operations in Russia under the name ECORYS-NEI (1, 2), a Russian version of the website, and a Russian legal entity, which provided services to government bodies across the CIS. As of August 2025, the company still operates in Russia under a new name, Ekkonis.

Less than a week after being appointed as Dodon’s economic adviser, Chicu travelled to Moscow. At a meeting with then Prime Minister Medvedev, he explained that the visit was motivated by “the closeness of the peoples, traditional friendly relations, shared values, common history, the Orthodox faith, and a shared vision of development” between Moldova and Russia. Following the visit, Russia granted Moldova a gas discount and a loan of $500 million. In January 2020, during a meeting with Medvedev’s successor Mikhail Mishustin, Chicu wished him success “for the prosperity of the Russian people” and thanked the Russian government for its support.

An investigation by RISE Project and the Dossier Centre uncovered a memo prepared by Oleg Alpeyev, a member of Russia’s General Staff Military Academy, for the Kremlin. The memo argued that the rise of Chicu’s “technocratic” government, open to cooperation with Moscow, created favourable conditions for strengthening Russian-Moldovan ties and “allowed Russia to apply “soft power” tools to achieve “the desired results for the subject country through its attractiveness to the object country,” i.e., Moldova.

In February 2024, Chicu backed the idea of resuming direct gas purchases from Gazprom, claiming this would end “fraudulent schemes” of buying gas via Europe. In his election programme, he pledged to maintain Moldova’s military neutrality, push for the withdrawal of Russian troops from the occupied Transnistrian region, and use “pragmatic foreign policy” to ease access for Moldovan goods and services in Russian and CIS markets.

Chicu also holds Romanian citizenship. In 2020–2021, several Romanian politicians called for it to be revoked due to his hostile remarks about Romania (1, 2). According to his 2023–2024 declarations, besides his role in the PDCM, he also received a salary from the bakery company Cahulpan SA (1, 2).

Mark Tkaciuk, a communist historian educated in Russia, took part in a movement that attempted to seize power in Moldova.

Tkaciuk Mark Evgenievich.
Born: 26 September 1966
Facebook, Instagram, Threads, VK, OK

A professional historian, Tkaciuk spent his childhood in Russia’s Krasnodar Krai before his family moved to Moldova. In the late 1980s, after graduating from university, he moved to St Petersburg and became an intern in the Ancient Sector of the Institute of the History of Material Culture of the Russian Academy of Sciences. At that time, he was also a member of the Confederación Anarquista Sindicalista (CAS). In 1995, Tkaciuk was appointed senior research fellow at the Institute of Archaeology of the Academy of Sciences of the Republic of Moldova, while continuing his work in St Petersburg (1, 2).

In an interview, Tkaciuk said that in the late 1990s he became close to Vladimir Voronin, then leader of the PCRM. In Parliament, Tkaciuk sat on the Foreign Policy Commission and the parliamentary friendship group with Russia. According to his page on the Parliament’s website, as of early 2010 he was also a member of the Central Committee and the Political Executive Committee of the PCRM.

Some Moldovan media linked his departure from the PCRM to his focus on developing the far-left movement Antifa Rezist in Moldova. Journalists reported that this group was financed by Russians and by Platon, also mentioned in this article. In November 2014, the police and prosecutor’s office announced that they had stopped plans for a violent coup. During searches of Antifa Rezist members, they reported finding weapons, ammunition and explosives, as well as maps of the CEC and public television buildings. Some of those detained were former or current members of the communist party.

In January 2016, Tkaciuk appeared on the Russian talk show “Pravo Golosa” (The Right to Vote) (1, 2). There, he called Voronin’s refusal to sign the “Kozak Memorandum” in November 2003 a mistake. This Russian proposal aimed to settle the “Transnistrian conflict” by creating a Federated Republic of Moldova. Under this plan, Gagauzia and the so-called “Transnistrian Moldovan Republic” would have the right to block federal laws. Moldova would also be required to demobilise its army, remain neutral, and allow Russian troops to be officially deployed in the Transnistrian region. Tkaciuk added that such a federation would have been a partner of Russia and dismissed Moldova’s European integration as a fiction.

Vladimir Voronin: congratulates Russians on their birthdays, keeps money in a Russian bank, and claims the United States is to blame for Russia’s war against Ukraine.

Voronin Vladimir Nikolaevich.
Born: 25 May 1941
Head of the PCRM, former President of Moldova (2001-2009).

In May 2015, he justified Russia’s annexation of Crimea. In February 2024, commenting on Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, Voronin blamed the United States, NATO, and Ukraine for the war: “There is clear interference from the United States and NATO countries, who are arming Ukraine and fueling such aggression. … The Ukrainians did not start this war; they fell victim to these provocations, which escalated to a scale that must be stopped. We must identify the forces that will prevent it. Once again, we return to the Americans and Europeans, who show no interest. They have turned Ukraine into a testing ground for military equipment, using old equipment funded by the countries supplying it.”

In June 2025, Voronin congratulated Russian communist leader Gennady Zyuganov on his birthday, whom he had met the previous month. Earlier in the same month, he praised Putin and “the entire Russian people” on Russia Day, writing: “Despite the numerous challenges and difficult circumstances today, the centuries-old and glorious history of your country inspires confidence that Russia will overcome all difficulties with honour and, as before, will remain one of the largest and strongest states in the world.”

He has been awarded orders of the Russian Orthodox Church (1, 2). According to an insider, Voronin is also registered in the EMIAS database, which indicates that he is not a foreigner. Additionally, an insider reports that as of 2012 he had registration in Moscow, and at the same time, the Moscow residents’ database listed him as a Russian citizen. As of January 2023, Voronin reportedly held a deposit in Russian Sberbank of approximately 2 million rubles. By January 2025, this had fallen to around 753 thousand rubles. At the same time, insiders (1, 2, 3, 4, 5) note that Voronin held a deposit or received other payments from the bank between 2003 and 2005, when he was President of Moldova.

Renato Usatii: Russian railways, wiretapping his rivals, visits to occupied Crimea, and the Russian Laundromat.

Usatîi Renato Gheorghe
Born: 04 November 1978.
Website, Facebook, Instagram, Twitter, YouTube, TikTok, VK, OK
Leader of “Our Party” since 2015. He has regularly travelled to Moscow since his university years.

Since 2004, he worked in Russia, and in 2005 he became director of the Russian manufacturer and supplier of solid fuel tools, CJSC “VPT-NN,” the leading supplier of these products for the state operator of the Russian railway network, JSC “Russian Railways” (RZhD), from that year. According to an insider, by March 2007, Usatii was also an adviser to the President of the Russian Olympic Committee. From 2013 to October 2014, he served as vice president of the Union of Railway Builders of Russia.

In 2014, Usatii began his political career in Moldova. He created a party, “Renato Usatii’s Party” (PARUS), but in September 2014 it was denied registration. The same month, he joined “Rodina,” which submitted its registration documents on the same day as PARUS.

In June 2015, Usatii was elected mayor of Bălți and was re-elected in October 2019 in the first round. In October 2015, after returning from Russia, he was detained by SIS at the airport over illegal wiretapping and breaching correspondence secrecy. The case concerned his publicising phone calls between Shor and former Prime Minister Vladimir Filat, regarding the withdrawal of ~$1b from the Moldovan banking system. He was released by the court the next day.

Investigations by the RISE Project and Center “Dossier” show that in the second half of 2015, the Russian Presidential Administration’s Department for Interregional and Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries, which liaised with pro-Russian Moldovan politicians, prepared a biographical dossier on Usatii. It stated: “Usatii consistently advocates maintaining close economic, political, cultural, spiritual, and humanitarian ties with Russia. He is ready for constructive cooperation with the Russian side.”

The dossier highlighted his “close contacts” with Bishop Marchel of Bălți and Fălești and noted that, “with the blessing of His Holiness Patriarch Kirill of Moscow and All Russia,” he had made and delivered six icons for each diocese of the Orthodox Church of Moldova. It also mentioned Usatii’s request to meet Kirill “to receive a blessing for further work in Moldova, and to discuss strengthening the Russian Orthodox Church’s position in the region.” It concluded: “Given the high moral authority of the Russian Orthodox Church in Moldova, it would be desirable to bless R. Usatii for the mayoralty in Bălți, which would boost his popularity and pro-Russian sentiment in Moldovan society.”

In April 2016, Usatii illegally visited Russian-occupied Crimea and met its occupation authorities. In October 2016, a Moldovan court issued an arrest warrant for him in connection with the 2012 attempted murder of Russian banker German Gorbuntsov in London. Gorbuntsov survived and accused Usatii of ordering the attack. After being declared wanted, Usatii left Moldova for Russia.

In June 2019, following a change of government in Moldova, he returned, was arrested, and released after a few hours. In December 2019, he said a criminal case was opened against him in Russia related to the Russian Laundromat schemes.

In April 2020, he was charged in absentia with participating in a criminal organisation and carrying out currency transactions to transfer funds abroad using forged documents (1, 2). According to the case files, between 2012 and 2014, he helped Russian Railways contractors move money from state contracts overseas. The total amount under charge was initially 500 billion rubles but later increased to 170 billion rubles.

According to insiders (1, 2, 3, 4, 5), Usatii was a defendant, removed from the wanted list at one point, then declared wanted again. In November 2024, Russian media reported that the Prosecutor General’s Office sent the case to court over the Russian Laundromat. As of July 2025, Usatii remains on the Russian Ministry of Internal Affairs wanted list.

In November 2006, Usatii received Russian citizenship and a new passport in October 2017. In November 2023, he asked Putin to revoke it, but as of July 2025, his passport is still valid.

After reviewing the activities of several prominent Moldovan politicians, it is clear that Russia has long invested in spreading its influence through them. These politicians have created various parties, consolidating their power into political forces.

Support for pro-Russian parties among some of Moldova’s population.

According to polls in June 2025, the most popular pro-Russian political forces in Moldova were the PSRM (Party of Socialists of the Republic of Moldova, led by Igor Dodon) with 16.4% of respondents who had made a choice. Ilan Shor’s new political project, the “Victory” Political Bloc, received 15.5%, while a new project that positions itself as pro-European, the “Alternative” Political Bloc (Ceban, Chicu, Tkaciuk), gained 10.3%. Other results included the “Alternative” bloc at 10.9% and “Our Party” at 9.3%. The poll did not include the Moldovan diaspora (1, 2) or residents of the Russian-occupied Transnistrian region (1, 2). Additionally, 30% of respondents did not indicate a choice.

The next poll in late June and early July 2025 showed that the most popular pro-Russian forces remained Shor’s “socialists” at 14.9%, the “Alternative” bloc at 9.4%, Dodon’s “Victory” bloc at 8.9%, and “Our Party” at 7.7%. At the same time, 30.3% of voters had not decided, refused to answer, or did not plan to vote.

In a poll conducted in the first half of August 2025, reflecting the political situation at that time, the Patriotic Bloc —formed by the PSRM, PCRM, PRIM, and PVM — was the most popular pro-Russian force, with 30.1% of respondents ready to vote for it. The “Alternative” bloc followed with 10.9%, and “Our Party” with 9.3%.

Analysts at the Molfar Intelligence Institute have examined Russian influence in Moldova, looking at the media, religion, society, sports, and some pro-Russian politicians. Together, these areas form a clear Russian “roof” over Moldova, using the country to advance its interests beyond Russia’s borders. Countering this influence is complex, but it cannot be ignored.